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II.—REALITY AS A SYSTEM OF FUNCTIONS.
BY GERALD CATOR.
I CALL those things functions of each other each of which is
itself in the same degree as it is not-its-other.
Every function is analysable into a system of subordinate
functions and these again into subordinate functions and so
on endlessly. A function regarded under this aspect of
plurality I shall call a functional system. Though, as I shall
contend, everything that can be in any way referred to is a
function and nothing at all else, yet since there arises in its
due place in the involutions of the functional system, one
function, to wit the human intelligence, as unaware of the
functional structure of its object-world, it is desirable to have
a word ' mnctionisable ' to express the recognition of this
structure as a potentiality, and another ' functionisation ' to
express the corresponding act.
My thesis is that functionisation—the becoming of a
function itself-and-not-another is that in which the Realness
of Reality and the Being of Being consists. The more func-
tionised the more real. So far as anything is it is as func-
tionised, as A-not-not-A.
To give some examples, matter, time and space are func-
tions. A Human Life having any thread of unity is a
function, so is the development of an idea or the history of
a nation.
Each of these taken as a whole, is, in so far as it has dis-
tinctness, and it has distinctness by the simultaneous and
correlative development of positive and negative relations.
It is important to note that functionisation is not a form
imposed on a pre-existent matter of some kind but it entirely
supplies both matter and form. Similarly a functional sys-
tem never exists completed as something containing but not
contained, but always taken as a whole it is a function op-
posed 10 its other.
Thus it is capable of endless analysis, for the elements re-
sulting from each analysis will always be functional systems,
and ir is capable of endless synthesis, for the whole resulting
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REALITY AS A SYSTEM OF FUNCTIONS. 343
from each succeeding synthesis will always be a functional ele-
ment, contrasted with and calling for synthesis with, its
other.
Prop. I.—Proof of the functional structure of all possible content
resting on its entire determination through a process which
is a process offnnctionisation, viz-, the continuous differentiation
and integration of a continuum.
When I say the world, the universe or Reality the picture
called up before my mind's eye is somewhat as follows:—
The Round Globe swinging through space, some pic-
ture of the distribution of Land and Water on it, the peoples,
their industry and history, leading back to Rome, Greece,
Babylon. Present events, political activities, reminiscences of
scraps from the newspapers, ddbris of recollections of reading,
the room I sit writing in, the scratching of the pen, the play
of the firelight, the children sleeping upstairs, the fore-
shadow of to-morrow's work.
Now that this world ia functionally determined I may show
in several ways, but of these the most suitable for the present
purpose is to exhibit the breakdown of the attempt to draw
a line between what is present to sensation and its Ideal
extension.
Directly we attempt to do this we become aware of ideal
elements in the very heart of the given and of a factual as-
pect in the Ideal. Nothing is merely given, nothing merely
ideal.
The This-Now which supports the ideal extension, is ap-
prehended as determined in illimitable time and space in which
it occupies an unique place.
Alter anything however far back in time and however far
off in space and you simultaneously give the This-Now a
compensating re-determination. The Matter which bulks so
largely in my this-now is there known in a concept which
has a history dependent on my past studies, and on my hav-
ing partly absorbed certain current philosophical and scientific
ideas ; it would not be for a savage as it is for me, his world
is as his mind is: his lack of general words is not a mere
lack of tools for expressing his ideas.
Any one who thinks of the senses as mere windows through
which the mind receives information of an independent and
ready-made world of sounds and sights may also think of ideas
in a similar way.
But whoever has got over this way of thinking will under-
stand that it is just as tree, no more true, and true for the
same reason, to speak of the same world as known by different
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344 GERALD CATOB :
knowere as it is to speak of the same object as perceived by
different senses.
It is in each case an inference of which the justification is
not its verification by experience but that it effects an inte-
gration of experience. The verification itself where it occurs
is only a special case of integration, for the fact verifying is
as much ideal as the idea verified.
Finally the ' I-myself' at the centre of my this-now is quick
with Ideality, intensely sensitive to every happening, mirror-
ing every possibility,, a function of infinite variables. The sort
of man I believe myself to be, the history that I (sometimes)
suppose myself to have had, the beliefs and dis-beliefs which
I suppose myself to possess: all these not only are deter-
minate only as loci, but even as loci they are the variable and
precarious resultants of ideal activities of inconceivable com-
plexity of actions and re-actions and re-reactions echoing back
on each other, modifying, annulling, intensifying each other,
entering into new cycles, going through evolutions of evolu-
tions, a swarming seething life of which every part is at every
moment balanced upon and supporting the whole, a veritable
microcosm, containing its histories, its pauses, its romances,
its tragedies.
It is no more true that the given this-now supports the
Ideal extension than it is true that the extension gives rise
to and supports the given ' this-now '.
Extension and given are interdependent, they rest on each
other: the real is a construction from the basis of the ideal.
Thus the whole universe, the given and the extension which
is intimately continuous with it, is in its entirety a functional
product, a product of contradiction disentangling differen-
tiation and reaction.
The Given and the Ideal extension reciprocally constitute
and determine each other by their difference from each other.
The character of Basis so far as the given has it is not an-
terior to the construction, but is a functionally bestowed char-
acteristic.
Prop. II.—Proof tliat everything nameable is functionally deter-
mined and that it is nothing but a function.
We are tempted to think of the functional system as some-
thing the being of which needs to be accounted for, that is
we think of some primeval nothing the dispossession of which
needs accounting for.
This is a great fallacy—there is no such prima facie pre-
sumption in favour of the aboriginal being of nothing, as
against the being of something.
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Take the most extreme case; think of that formless, time-
less, spacelessness which would remain if God annihilated
every trace of Himself and of everything else.
This ' nothing' is as plainly an ideal or functional con-
struction as ' the universe ' for it is a universal ablation, a
negative reflexion of all possible being.
In short alter anything anywhere and you alter everything
everywhere for everything is ' alter ' to everything else, that
this is so is the presupposition of all possibilities; Being and
nothing alike arise within and depend upon their reciprocity.
How necessary this reciprocity is we may see by this, that if
everything could absorb its other it would annihilate itself in
doing so.
If we cannot say at once: anything which was everything
would fail to be even nothing, we cannot say it only because
in regarding the everything as failing to be nothing we invest
it with a character of exclusiou and so we regard it as not
everything, ic, as not including nothing, for nothing is
something so far as it is ' not-auything '. . . .
If the reader is a student of Idealism, he will find the
route traversed in this paper so familiar to him that he may
well be tempted to inquire whether there is anything at all
novel about it, except the replacement of the ordinary ter-
minology of subject and object by an awkward ' functional'
terminology.
Now, though I am by no means in a position to claim or
anxious to claim any degree of originality (since by doing so
I should expose my conclusions to be criticised as nothing
but the fads of an amateur speculator, whereas I believe that
in very great measure they are the common possession of
many thinkers of this time and of previous times also), yet
I must say for myself what the reasons are which have led me
to regard Functionalism as an improvement on Idealism not
only as a terminology but also in substance.
The ego the ' subject' of Idealism is always clogged with
the associations which cling to the subject, I myself; you,
,—Psychological Individuals with histories. The Psy-
chological Ego, is so much besides a thinker of thoughts that
inevitably its thoughts appear like mere passing accidents in
its substance, like reflexions in a mirror.
Idealist thinking then starting with ' subject' loaded with
these associations is exposed to a constant warping tendency
to think of the subject as a thing, a substance.
For me subject and object are completely correlative func-
tions, the subject is subject of the object and the object object
of the subject. The object is not more dependent on the sub-
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ject than the subject on the object. Ease is percipere for the
subject and percipi for the object. This interdependence and
co-relativity is complete, like that of the S. and N. Poles of a
magnet. No object without a subject, no subject without an
object. To such and such an individual subject such and
such an individual object. They are a true functional pair
of which the test is this, each would be the other in the
other's place. So far as the same object is object for several
minds, so far they are the same subject. So far as there is
difference of subject there can not be identity of object. To
the diffused undifferentiated object of early soul life corre-
sponds a diffused undifferentiated subject, the differentiation
of the subject proceeds pari passu with that of the object
By regarding the matter in this way we not only gain an
apprehension of the interdependence of subject and object so as
to see that there can be no subject without an object and no
object without a subject, but we also learn to regard
the subject side of Eeality as an ideal construction equally
with the object side, by doing thus we are entirely freed from
the familiar difficulty of solipsism. I do not know my mind
by experience simply and yours by inference simply. I, at
least, so far as ' I ' has definite import, and you subject to
the same condition, are alike for me ideal constructions stand-
ing or falling together.
' I ' arise in an experience which I then call' mine ' just in
the same way as time or space or matter or indeed any other
definite object of representation, whether present or absent,
concrete or universal, material or immaterial, that is through
the activity of a synthesising principle. All alike arise as, and
all alike strictly speaking must ever remain, hypotheses, in
principle at least, subject to correction. This is a direct and
most vital consequence of the view adopted in this paper, and
therefore I cannot insist too strongly upon it.
According then to the functional view the universe, matter
and form together, is a system, a complete and therefore an
exhaustive, an infinite, a self-conscious, a self-contained, a self-
representative system.
Whenever within it is found independence, individuality,
exclusiveness, uniqueness, isolation, the reason of these char-
acters and their assignment to such and such points of the
system must be sought in the inner necessity of the system
itself, they and all other characteristics are functionally con-
ferred.
Take as example the difference between ideal and real,
consider how the idea of the inkpot now before your eyes
differs from the thing itself and you will find the reason is
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REALITY AS A SYSTEM OF FUNCTIONS. 347
this, the idea is universal because ideal and ideal because
incompletely determined, ie. determined in an incomplete
system, which, because incomplete, in turn is subordinate to
an including system.
The real inkpot is completely determined and rests in its
place in the ultimate system. The Real is real for no other
reason than because it alone is completely ideal.1
I have already done something (Props. 1 arid 2) towards
proving by analysis the functional view, but I now propose to
give another proof by synthesis.
Prop. III.—The Functional view is true, because it is incapable of
being false, every possible adverse suggestion is not only con-
sistent with it bid is necessary to it, that is every suoh adverse
suggestion far from contradicting the functional view is one of
the subordinate functions necessary to its completeness and as
such ministers to and supports it.
Just so one can imagine that given a full insight into cir-
cumstances one might see in a given case of conduct the only
way to act, the only honourable thing to do might be some-
thing indefensible, according to all ordinary rules. The point
of the illustration is that in the end all apparent exceptions
to the functional view are instances of it
Let us consider that no possible representation can have
other characteristics than functional ones, which therefore
will place it in its own unique place in the exhaustive func-
tional system. The Character which seems to resist inclusion
in the functional system, derives its whole strength and being,
its character of resistance too, from that system.
For the present purpose, and as I think for all purposes
actuality, present existence, with all its determination, if so be
Jiere in the time series and here in space, is a matter of con-
tent—is a characteristic of content, a quality like redness or
pungency. A merely possible object differs in content from
the same object as actual, just as triangular differs in content
from square, and therefore just as the completion of the
series of geometrical figures will give rise to triangularity as
well as to squareness and then to triangles as well as to
squares, so in the ultimate functional system there must be
actuality as well as possibility and then individual actuals,
with all their individuating principles and entourage of
accidents.
1
 I may refer the reader to my two previous pajjers on this same subject.
The first published in MISD (N.S., 61) under the title 'The Structure
of Reality,' the second in the Monitt, October, 1908, "Id quo majus
cogitari nequit'.
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348 GERALD CATOR:
What is your objection to this syllogism demonstrating the
content of the functional syBtem by means of the idea of
completeness—
A complete system must include everything
The functional system is a complete system—ergo
Perhaps you distinguish, saying
A complete system (if it exists) must include everything,
adding that, from the fact that I have what I suppose to be
the Idea of a complete system, it by no means follows that
such a system exists without the mind.
I answer that a complete system with all that belongs to-
its completeness is incapable of not existing. For you can-
not avoid this—that if the system were complete it would
include this your doubt of its actual actuality. Your doubt
is in fact a function of the complete system ; one of its ne-
cessary elements.
But from (1)' if the system existed this doubt would exist'
to (2) ' this doubt exists, therefore the system exists ' is a per-
fectly good and stringent inference.
This inference it will be seen is m the form—If A then B
to If B then A. Take a complete system and as it were draw
a line across it anywhere so as to divide it into two parts, A
and B, then since the system A + B is complete, all that
is not B is A, and all that is not A is B, then A and B are
functions, each is not-the-other; each in the other's place
would be that other, for they differ only by their systematic
positions. Therefore the completement of each, that which
follows from each, which rills up the gap in Reality left by the
inclusion of either alone, is precisely the other.
To summarise this argument. If your doubt of the actual
existence of a complete system does not stand between it and
actual existence, then nothing stands between and it exists.
But your doubt does not so stand, on the contrary regarded
as standing alone it is precisely that last determination which
confers actuality.
Prop. IV.—Tlie functional system because of its completeness is
eternally and perfectly self-conscious at the point and in the
mode dictated by its nature.
As complete or perfect (which is the same thing) the func-
tional system must possess itself, be for itself, be object to
itself as subject, and this is self-consciousness. Moreover
only by making it self-representative, containing itself with-
in itself, which again is self-consciousness, can its infiniteness
be conciliated with its individuality and completeness.
By repetition of the same reasons, it is necessary that the
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REALITY AS A SYSTEM OF FUNCTIONS. 349
self-consciousness of the functional system should be entirely
concentrated at and vested in its Functional Absolute, God—
the Absolute. Absoluteness like all else is a functional de-
termination, the Absolute would be nothing apart from the
relative, and plainly this relativity of the Absolute to the
Relative, this dependence of the Absolute on the Relative is
no prejudice to its Absoluteness.
The independent to be that needs something to be indepen-
dent of, for this is part of the meaning of independence, and
similarly the Absolute needs something to be above external
relation to.
By maintaining this we do not in any way taint or dim the
Aseity of God, nor do we even inchoatively give the Universe
anything like a pluralistic or Federal Constitution by making
God in some sense only the first among equals.
For us as for 8. Bernard, God is
Purus, simplex, integer perfectus constans sibi.
There cannot be any ideal of a non-functional Absolute
which should be as it were the Real thing, the standard which
our Functional Absolute invites comparison with and is
condemned by. The Functional Absolute is the Absolute
Simpliciter. Philosophy is every bit as much concerned as
Theology in maintaining the incornmunicability of God.
In accordance also with our functional view, we say now
that in the Perfection of God's Self-Knowledge there is in-
volved the Perfect possession of Other-Knowledge. Knowing
Himself as Super-Being Super-One super-measure, i.e. above
all measure and degree, He knows also in the intimacy of its
presentation in its full detail and individuality all possible
other. We are tempted to think of God as possessing a sort
of bird's-eye view of the universe like one would have of a
landscape from a balloon, a chequer work of fields and hedges,
little toy cottages with smoke coming from the chimneys, little
dots of men working in the fields. Instead of this way of think-
ing we ought to think of God as having a magnified view of
everything. Compared to His Eternal Knowledge my present
knowledge of my sensations, the feel of my pen, the ta3te in
my mouth is phantasmic and unreal.1 Neither should we
think of God as lacking any kind of experience, for though as
S. Thomas says, desit sibi sensitiva cognitio, as such yet He
possesses it ' Emiiicnter '. He does not know the freshness
of the morning only through our senses, as object He pos-
sesses in Himself all objectivity, and as subject all subjectivity
1
 God working in man is more intimately present in him than man is
even in himself. (The Encyclical Pascandi, official translation, p. 23.)
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including that of sensitive creatures. He knows iu eternity
not as excluded from knowing in time. He lacks nothing.
We must now steer our course past one of the most dan-
gerous rocks in all Philosophy by inquiring what is the
relation between the Human or other finite intelligence and
the Divine intelligence, and between the Human objects and
the Divine objects. Also what is the corresponding relation
between one human intelligence and another, and between
the same human intelligence and itself when turned to differ-
ent subjects or at different times.
I will here remark that the view which as I understand it
is now held by Psychologists as to the structure of the mind,
namely that it is an apperceptive system itself in some degree
subordinate to a social consciousness and having other apper-
ceptive systems subordinate to it,—the minds of the individual
as it were on various subjects, seem to me to support very
strongly the general functionalist view upheld in this essay.
For not only in this view is a mind regarded as a hier-
archical system of ideas, a subsistent theory, not only is it
shown as plainly a construction and not a datum, but for it
the private mind of the individual enters as an element into
a wider common-consciousness to which it stands in the same
relation as the subordinate minds or apperceptive systems
within it to itself. The whole process of the building up of
a mind is presented as one of individuation by the differ-
entiation of an original continuum.
A dictum of Aristotle's repeatedly used by S. Thomas, is
that the knower and his knowledge are one, and the reader
will see how entirely this harmonises with the view as to the
absolute correlativity of subject and object maintained in this
way.
But this view leads us as it led the scholastics straight up
to a difficulty 'de Unitate Intellectus '.
If the knower and his knowledge are one, then to one
knowledge one knower. If the knowledge is absolute truth,
then the knower is absolute mind. If the knowledge is uni-
versal, can the knower be individual and separata1
Again, on the side of the object if being is univocal, we who
know (some) being therefore know what God knows, our in-
1
 Licet enira intellectus meus sit individuua et separates ab infcellectu
tuo, tamen seoundum quod eat individuas non habet univenuUe in ipso et
ideo non individuatur id quod est in infcellectu—sic igitur unirersale ut
univorsale est unique et uemper idem omuino et idem in aminabus omnium
non recipient individuationein nb anima. (Albertus MagnuB. quoted by
Haureau. Hist, de In Phil. Sroli, p. tt». Vol. II.)
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tellects are therefore so far indiscernible from His and since
there can be no distinction without difference they are iden-
tical with His.
A Philosophy may be known by its difficulties; and a
Philosophy which like the Scholastic found itself fighting for
its life de unitate intellectus cannot have been the first
artless systematisation of common-sense notions that Prof.
James would have us believe it.
The intemperate use of the principle of excluded middle
is, I believe, responsible for a great part of our speculative
troubles. We tend to infer far too hastily the falsehood of
one statement from the truth of some other. Everything
must have some one and no more real taste, shape, smell,
colour, texture, every statement must be either true or false, if
it is not wholly, universally, absolutely true then it is not
true, that is, it is false.
I think I hardly believe at all in inconceivables, incoin-
possibles or intrinsic self-contradictions. In fact there is
always some reference to context in what purport to be self-
contained universal truths. Descartes chose the equivalence
of the three interior angles of a triangle to two rights as one
of those truths we cannot doubt and yet in non-Euclidean geo-
metry we doubt it easily enough. How many of the painful
crises of life arise from our having to choose between two
right-wrong things. I am prepared to go further and to offer
to replace the formula that a judgment cannot be true if it
is false, by the formula that a judgment cannot be true unless
it is false. A Real Judgment, judged in real life, not one of
the simulcra we experiment with when reading Logic books,
adjudicates something previously in doubt, is directed against
some prima facie truth. If what it slays is a mere ghost, it,
the slayer, is a ghost. Truth and falsehood are interdependent
functions and the denial of a ' great error ' is a great truth.
A statement which is true when made in the midst of con-
troversy and is therefore hotly denied, perishes of its success
(as has often happened in theological controversies) if it suc-
ceeds so completely as to drive its adversary off the field.
There is always a need for His Majesty's opposition, if we
are not to lose hold of some truth. This is not merely because
we become lazy and forget the grounds of our Belief. It lies
deeper and in- the nature of truth. Correspondence with
Beality is impossible unless the correspondents are different.
The truth of a theory, the significance of its affirmation lies
in this, that it leads to something, does not exhaust the sub-
ject and therefore in that it is iiot as it stands, as it is formu-
lated, completely true.
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Take for an example the Geocentric and Heliocentric as-
tronomies. According to common sense if it is true that the
earth moves round the sun which stands still, it is false that
the sun moves round the earth which stands still. And yet
Heliocentricism is but a half-truth though for astronomical
purposes and for present day interests it is the larger half.
If we treat it as wholly true it leads us to forget the relativity
of motion. There is one aspect of the facts which can only
be expressed by remembering the possibility of a Geocentric
formulation. If this aspect is fully and vividly apprehended,
it in turn will require for its full comprehension the appre-
hension of this aspect of it, viz., that it is such as to have a
tendency to exclude from Human Belief the Heliocentric
formulation. Thus its falsehood, ».«., its capacity for mis-
leading, is part of its truth. Incompossibility is a question
of mental grasp and compass. Different minds can support
synthesis elaborated to different degrees, that which for a low
synthesis is incompossible with some truth, becomes for a
higher synthesis a complementary and confirmatory aspect
of it.
Here is a rough pictorial illustration of the nature of error.
Given what ought at a given time and in given circum-
stances to be believed and supposing that the apperceptive
rank of minds can be arranged in an ascending series, a, b, c, d.
And that syntheses of the universe can be arranged in a cor-
responding series, A, B, C, D.
Then in each succeeding synthesis, propositions will appear
as complementary which in the lower synthesis were contra-
dictory.
To find out whether the truth of some particular proposition
for a given man involves the falsehood of some one other pro-
position, see whether his mind is or is not of sufficiently high
rank to contain the grade of synthesis which unites the two.
Further, in simple and in elastic minds at any rate, truth
and error do not merely grow side by side like wheat and
tares in a field, they are connected like the Siamese twins,
kill the error and the truth will bleed to death.
A mentality is all of a piece, ita error is as characteristic of
it as its truth. TJiis truth and this error; this error and this
truth, are reciprocally connected as necessarily within a given
type of mentality as three sides and three angles, three angles
and three sides are in Euclidean space. If A then B, if B
then A.
Concepts are instruments—instruments of knowing, and as
such they must ue adapted to the apperceptive level of the
mind which has to use them. Iven in tke intellectual life
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an ambition is possible which overreaches itself and an ac-
ceptance of my ' station and its duties' needs to be preached.1
If for example we try to think habitually sub specie aeter-
nilatis the only result is that we lose our grasp on time,
without gaining a grasp of eternity, if we are too proud to
be anthropomorphic, we pay the penalty in dimmed appre-
hension of God's personality. Thus the problem of how much
in the way of knowing to attempt is for each of us a practical
one, a housewife's problem of laying out our mental capital
to the beat advantage, we may fail either by attempting too
little, or by attempting too much universality. And surely
danger lies on both sides, we have to balance the advantage
of gaining so much universality against the practically conse-
quent Ios9 of so much vividness and intimacy of apprehension.
Just in the same way too little struggle for existence as in the
tropics harms men by enervating them, and too much struggle
as m Arctic regions, harms them by crushing them down.
Please note that these are only illustrations, intentionally
overstated, and that I do not believe either men, or ages, or
circumstances to differ from each other to anything like the
extent these illustrations seem to suggest, and that in par-
ticular I do not consent to the idea of an intellectual 6Hte,
believing one thing themselves and conniving at the common
people believing another.*
Now what started us on this long discussion about truth
and error, was that some scholastics did not see how if our
eternal truths differ from God's, they can be anything but
false, since God's truths are purely true. I think our discus-
sion will have given the key to the problem, our best truths
are only half or three quarters or it may be nine-tenths true.
God's truths are wholly true, they end in vision and exhaust
reality. Scientia Dei est causa Rerum.
I propose now in the interests of the main discussion, the
discussion as to the relation of Finite and Infinite mind, to
apply these views to the question which seems most refrac-
tory of all: that of the relation of time and eternity.
1
 Et sic fit ut, ad ea quae stint notissima lerum noeter intellectas se
habeat, ut oculua nootuae ad solem, at seoando Mctaphysicorum dicitar.
(S. Thomas, S.C.G., Book L, chap. li .) We cannot bear too much light
•I should like to emphasise at this point that I do believe in a syn-
thesis appropriate to the man plane of mind ! which differentiates men as
a ' species ' of knowers from such Beings as angels, in a far more funda-
mental way than individual differences differentiate one human individual
from another. The man plane of mind is a conception I gained from
Prof. Laurie's Synthetica, and the extent to which I shall have made
the importance and the legitimacy of this conception felt will be to a large
extent the measure of my success in this essay.
23
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We humans are as deeply committed as it is possible to be
to the non-coexistence of events succeeding one another in
time, and only a considerable amount of schooling in philo-
sophical thinking can render as able even to understand the
possibility of doubting the reality of time, or of recognising
in our concept ' time ' the presence of hypothetical elements.
Of events which succeed in time the condition of the coming
into existence of the latter is the going out of existence of
the former. Yesterday is past and over and God Himself
cannot make it otherwise. Please note that we only evade
the difficulty if we think of God merely as knowing the
future certainly as we know it conjecturally. He is not in
time. Events do not approach Him from the future, swirl
past Him, and float away into the past. We are often
tempted to think that it is futile to pray for something
which either in itself or in its causes is determined before
the prayer is prayed, e.g. the pregnant mother's prayer as to
the sex of the child she bears within her. But God cannot
so regard it as futile, for to His Eternal Will the prayer
though coming in the time order after the event may still
in the eternal order be the cause of His decreeing it to be so.
Imagine a circle with an inscribed Polygon of N. sides.
The circle represents reality the goal of thought; the Poly-
gon, the system of Ideas through which Beality is appre-
hended, then the Ideal system approximates to Beality in
proportion to the number of side n-2n-4n but can never
coincide with it. Suppose farther that the Polygon is actu-
ated by some kind of spring which causes it, if left to itself,
to lose contact with the. circle at every other point, and then
every other remaining point, so that if the sides were 4n at
the moment of release they would pass through 4n-2n-n.
For each of us the number of sides of our Polygon
measures our apperceptive level at any moment.
Every one will have experience how this swells and
shrinkp. sometimes expanding and magnifying till one seems
to be ' spectator of all time and of all existence,' sometimes
shrinking into a painful blur in which we see men as trees
walking, can apprehend and retain nothing. In the first
state we have almost a foretaste of Eternity, events as they
happen are received without jar into the places waiting for
them. In the second state, for we are as much below the
capacity of being surprised as in the first we are above it, we
live the dull, hopeless, apathetic, momentary life of animals.
The distance between our ideas and reality is thus measured
by degree of apperceptive level; as the ideal expands, it ex-
pands towards the Beal.
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My second illustration is this. Take the circle as before:
God as ' Subject-object' is the centre
Suppose Radii, and then as it were move the centre out-
wards towards the circumference and let this represent a
degradation of apperceptive level, in moving outwards and
io still trying to synthesise the Radii, it as subject will
undergo distortion and the correlative object will undergo an
entirely parallel distortion ; increasing in degree according to
the distance moved from the true centre.
Return to the instance of time.
Eternity is for God what time is for us. Time is eternity
seen through human eyes, as the mind shrinks in appercep-
tive level, its eternity becomes more and more compounded
with absolute discontinuity. Time is the product of this
composition. Placing for illustration—God—the Angels—
Plato—the writer—a rustic—an animal—a stone in a de-
scending series—we see the character of the duration change
Eternity—Aevum—Time1 time* time3—till at the animal,
there only remains a flicker of the light of eternity to serve
to make the darkness visible, at the stone this has given out
and the darkness is extinguished with the light1
We misinterpret our sentiments and do ourselves much
injustice through taking too unrestricted a view of our im-
mersion in time. Our interest in the future, in eternity and
eternal interests, is not wholly dependent on there being a
life beyond the grave. We are not wholly cut off from the
future and the past; for the past is not wholly not now and
the future is not wholly not yet
It is useful practice to suppose that perhaps some day we
may recognise in the time-hypothesis only a half truth. The
facts it covers might be otherwise theorised.
We can imagine something similar in the case of space,
though not so easily. Thus unity is the first attribute of
God and extension with its impenetrability is a sort of com-
promise between being and nothing.
Thus I look out over a beautiful landscape and I see
extended beauty; the extension a partially self-neutralising
distortion of the self-possession of God ; the beauty a parti-
ally self-neutralising distortion of His Glory.
I suppose the conatural worlds of finite subjects, their
objects, their Gods, to be in their particularity distortion
effects, depending on their distance from God, and all their
field of consciousness to undergo a corresponding modifica-
tion, in terms of distance from God, all to be marked as it
1
 On the fading away of time as knowledge increases, see Bosanqnet,
Logic, pp. 271-6 (TOI. I.).
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were with the same ' local sign'. What His essence is to
God, that the material object is to us, the active Infinity of
God, becomes for us mere unfinishedness infinite relativity,
as in time, space, infinite divisibility of matter and so on,
God's Intellectus which is His essence, withers down in us
to discursive reason, blundering forward ' step by step'.
Our self-evident first principles are to the Divine Word in
which God sees all things, like the last degenerate represen-
tative of a noble family—their chief remaining characteristic,
obstinacy and pride. Our personality, our self-consciousness,
our very being are mere shrunken shadows of His. In com-
parison with His Being and His Knowledge, we are not,
know not
Yet as S. Thomas says of the human mind, remanet in re
qiuzdam Infinitas—this is the analogous qualitative identity of
each of our minds with a virtuality of the Divine mind, be-
cause of this we, each of us and God, know the same world
and not a numerically different representation of it.
Thus we can see the whole World in terms of God. God
is the Absolute synthesis. He unites for Himself absolute
unity with the exhaustion of -every possible degree and
variation of negativity. Every fleeting appearance is in its
possibility necessary to God. He stands to the world in a
Eelation of irrelativity. He is the Absolute—the Absolute
of the Relative Finitude contributes to His Aseity; He
as it were makes His enemies His footstool.
Thus appearance in all its modes is not as Mr. Bradley's
work suggests an effect of ' imagination it is in its place as
real as reality, they live with the same life.
We have not to choose between the intelligible world
as a kind of cold ballet of bloodless categories and this
kind warm earth with its life of daily hopes and fears, its
soliditieb and opacities, its abruptnesses and contingencies.
Our America is here—our common Daily Life Divine.
The ideal in the sensible is for us that primary and support-
ing Heal, which God is for Himself. By placing it at the
heart of our knowledge, by accepting it as our primary real,
we know as God in our place, and this is what I want to make
the moral and the conclusion of this essay. The world,
matter and form, is reason throughout;; let us therefore trust
our Reason and fear not illusion, for the deliverances of our
Reason are the content of the Eternal Reason at the man
plane of mind.1
1
 P. Rouaselot's IntelUctualitnu de S. Thomai shows very strikingly
how great the gulf is which in Thomist Philosophy separates Divine from
Human intellection. S. Thomas as interpreted by Dr. Rousselot ifl really
an Idealist of Hegelian TYPE. TO this interpretation I humbly subscribe.
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